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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

This Court has jurisdiction to decide this appeal,
pursuant to Utah Code Annotated Section 78-2a-3 (2) (d) and (e).

NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS BELOW

This appeal is taken by the prosecution from the Order
Suppressing Evidence entered by the Circuit Court of Garfield
County, State of Utah, on May 13, 1988.
was held on March 17, 1988.

A suppression hearing

On April 27, 1988, the Court entered

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, resulting in the Order
Suppressing Evidence which is the subject of this appeal.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES

1.

Whether there was reasonable suspicion to stop

defendant's vehicle, under Utah Code Annotated Section 77-7-15.
2.

Whether the act of defendant's vehicle turning

around and fleeing from a roadblock constitutes reasonable cause
to arrest the defendant, pursuant to Utah Code Annotated Section
77-7-2.
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GOVERNING STATUTES

1.

Utah Code Annotated Section 77-7-15 provides as follows:

A peace officer may stop any person in a public place
when he has a reasonable suspicion to believe he has
committed or is in the act of committing or is attempting
to commit a public offense and may demand his name, address
and an explanation of his actions.
2.

Utah Code Annotated Section 77-7-2 provides as follows:

A peace officer may make an arrest under authority of
a warrant or may, without warrant, arrest a person:
1. for any public offense committed or attempted
in the presence of any peace officer; "presence"
includes all of the physical senses or any device
that enhances the acuity, sensitivity, or range of
any physical sense, or records the observations of
any of the physical senses;
2. when he has reasonable cause to believe a felony
has been committed and has reasonable cause to believe
that the person arrested has committed it;
3. when he has reasonable cause to believe the person
has committed a public offense, and there is reasonable
cause for believing the person may:
(a) flee or conceal himself to avoid arrest;
(b) destroy or conceal evidence of the commission
of the offense; or
(c) injure another person or damage property
belonging to another person.
Copies of both statutes are included in the Appendix hereto.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant MARK TALBOT was charged by Information in the
Circuit Court of Garfield County, Panguitch City Department with
various alcohol and drug-related offenses.

Defense counsel filed

both a Motion to Suppress Evidence Based Upon Illegal Roadblock,
and a Motion to Suppress Evidence Based Upon Illegal Stop.
-2-

A

suppression hearing was held on March 17, 1988, and the parties filed
various memoranda in support of their respective positions.

On April

27, 1988, the Court entered Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.
On May 13, 1988, the Court entered its Order Suppressing Evidence,
in which it denied defendant's Motion to Suppress Evidence Based
Upon Illegal Roadblock, but granted defendant's Motion to Suppress
Evidence Based Upon Illegal Stop.

Copies of the Findings of Fact

and Conclusions of Law and the Order Suppressing Evidence are included
in the Addendum to this Brief.

This appeal is taken from that Order

Suppressing Evidence.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
In the early morning hours on June 20, 1987, a roadblock
was set up by the Garfield County Sheriff's Office on S.R. 143, commonly referred to as the Panguitch Lake Road, some 2^-3 miles South
of Panguitch, Garfield County, State of Utah.

(Suppression Hearing

Transcript, hereafter referred to as "Tr.", pp. 8, 26-27.)

Earlier

that night, the roadblock had initially been set up on U.S. 89, South
of Panguitch, pursuant to a plan made a few days earlier.
pp. 8,18,20-21,33-34)

(Tr.,

The roadblock was designed to stop all vehicles,

traveling in both directions, to check on driver's licenses, vehicle
registration, and safety equipment.

(Tr., pp.8-9, 18-19)

At approximately

12:15 a.m., the roadblock was moved to the Panguitch Lake Road location.
(Tr., pp.8, 26-27)
The roadblock on S.R. 143 was manned by the Garfield County
Sheriff, a deputy sheriff, and two members of the Sheriff's Posse
who are Category II peace officers.
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(Tr., pp. 9,27)

Two Sheriff's

vehicles were parked on either side of the road, facing in opposite
directions, with their red and blue grill lights, red spotlights,
and yellow emergency lights all flashing.

(Tr. pp. 22-24, 104-105)

In addition, the truck belonging to the Posse members was equipped
with flashing red lights.

(Tr., pp. 23 28)

in the road with their flashlights on.

The officers were standing

(Tr., pp. 44, 119)

At approximately 1:00 a.m., the officers at the roadblock
observed a Southbound vehicle approach the crest
North of the roadblock.

of a hill located

As soon as the driver noticed the flashing

red, blue and yellow lights at the roadblock, the vehicle stopped
abruptly, turned around

in the middle of the road, and headed back

North toward Panguitch. (Tr., pp. 9-11, 29, 44-45, 109)

At the point

where the vehicle turned around, on the crest of the hill, there
are no

turn-outs, and the road is a narrow, two-lane mountain road.

(Tr., pp. 10,44-45,109,114)

There are several wide turn-outs and

road intersections along that portion of the Panguitch Lake Road,
where a safe turn-around can be made, including the location of the
roadblock, which had wide turn-outs on both

sides of the road.

(Tr., pp. 109,112,117,121-22)
When the Sheriff observed the vehicle turn around suddenly
and head back toward Panguitch, he suspected that the driver was
attempting to evade the roadblock, since it stopped and turned around
as soon as it came over the crest of the hill and observed the lights
at the roadblock.

(Tr., pp.11,29,46)

Therefore, the Sheriff directed

the two Posse members to pursue and stop the vehicle.

(Tr., pp.

16,30)
As the Posse members pursued and eventually caught up
-4-

with the subject vehicle, on the way back toward Panguitch, the red
flashing lights on the Posse truck were turned on, but the vehicle
failed to pull over and stop.

(Tr., pp. 47-48)

The Posse members

then called the Sherifffs Office in Panguitch by radio for assistance.
(Tr., pp. 49, 69, 96)
When the fleeing vehicle reached the outskirts of Panguitch,
it turned off the main road onto a side street and headed down a
back street in town.

(Tr., pp. 50, 69, 91). A deputy sheriff and

another Category II Officer, responding to the call for assistance,
came from the other direction and intercepted the vehicle.
pp. 70,91-92).

(Tr.,

The Sheriff's vehicle turned on its red lights and

stopped the vehicle.

(Tr., pp. 72, 92, 100)

The defendant was found inside the vehicle, with alcohol
and marijuana, in the presence of juveniles.
94)

He was subsequently arrested.

(Tr., pp. 84-85, 93-

(Tr., pp. 85, 93-94).

STANDARD OF REVIEW
"When faced with a motion to suppress, the trial court must
determine whether proffered evidence is constitutionally defective.
In making this determination, the court is often required to resolve
preliminary factual disputes.

Because of the trial court's position

of advantage to observe witnesses' demeanor and other factors bearing
on credibility, we will not disturb its factual assessment underlying
a decision to grant or deny a suppression motion unless it clearly appears that the lower court was in error."
1255 (Utah 1987) at 1258.
-5-

State v. Ashe, 745 P. 2d

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
1.

When the defendant's vehicle came over the crest of

the hill and saw the lights at the roadblock, it stopped abruptly,
turned around in the middle of the road, and headed back toward town.
Those actions gave rise to reasonable suspicion on the part of the
officers at the roadblock that the occupants of the vehicle were engaged in criminal activity.

Pursuant to Utah Code Annotated Section

77-7-15, the officers were therefore entitled to stop the defendant's
vehicle to investigate the matter further.
2.

The defendant's vehicle failed to stop at the road-

block, in spite of the flashing red lights which it observed as soon
as it came over the crest of the hill.

The defendant's vehicle stopped

and turned around on the approach to, or near the crest of, a hill on
a narrow, two-lane mountain road, with limited visibility in either
direction.

On the way back to Panguitch, the pursuing Posse vehicle

again flashed its red lights at the defendant's vehicle, which failed
to pull over and stop.

Instead, when it arrived back in town, the

defendant's vehicle turned off on a side street and headed down a
back street in town.

Those actions on the part of the defendant con-

stituted various traffic offenses committed in the presence of the
officers, and, therefore, the stop of the defendant's vehicle was
proper as incident to those traffic offenses.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I: THERE WAS REASONABLE SUSPICION
VEHICLE IN THIS CASE.

TO STOP THE DEFENDANT'S

Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-15 provides as follows:
A peace officer may stop any person in a public place when
he has a reasonable suspicion to believe he has committed
or is in the act of committing or is attempting to commit
a public offense and may demand his name, address and
an explanation of his actions.
Shortly after that statute was enacted in the State of
Utah, in United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411 (1981), the United
States Supreme Court explained the "reasonable suspicion " standard
in these

terms:
"Courts have used a variety of terms to capture the elusive
concept of what cause is sufficient to authorize police
to stop a person. Terms like Articulable reasons" and
"founded suspicion" are not self-d ef ining; they fall short
of providing clear guidance dispositive of the myriad
factual situations that arise.
But the essence of all
that has b ^ n written is that the totality of the circumstancesthe whole picture- must be taken into account. Based
upon that whole picture the detaining officers must have a
particularized and objective basis for suspecting the
particular person stopped of criminal activity. ...
The idea that an assessment of the whole picture
must yield a particularized suspicion contains two elements,
each of which must be present before a stop is permissible.
First, the assessment must be based upon all of the circumstances. The analysis proceeds with various objective
observations, information from police reports, if such
are available and consideration of the modes or patterns
of operation of certain kinds of lawbreakers. From these
data, a trained officer draws inferences and makes deductionsinferences and deductions that might well elude an untrained
person.
The process does not deal with hard certainties,
but with probabilities. Long before the law of probabilities was articulated as such, practical people formulated
certain common-sense conclusions about human behavior;
jurors as factfinders are permitted to do the same- and
so are law enforcement officers. Finally, the evidence
thus collected must be seen and weighed not ir terms of
library analysis by scholars, but as understood by those
versed in the field of law enforcement.
-7-

The second element contained in the idea that
an assessment of the whole picture must yield a particularized suspicion is the concept that the process just described
must raise a suspicion that the particular individual
being stopped is engaged in wrongdoing. ..."
United
States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411 (1981) at 417-418. (Emphasis
added. )
In the eight years since Sect ion 77-7-15 was enacted, the
appellate courts in the State of Utah have given some guidance on
the dimensions of this " reasonable suspicion " standard in Utah.
In State v. Gibson, 665 P. 2d 1302 ( Utah 1983), cert. denied, 464
U.S. 894 (1983), the police stopped the defendant, based on the belief
that his driver's license had been revoked, since the officer had
previously arrested the defendant for drunk driving, and knew that
his driver's license had previously been revoked.

The Supreme Court

held that the officer had a "reasonable suspicion" that the defendant's
driver's license was still revoked, and upheld the stop of the defendant's
vehicle.
In State v. Houspr, 669 P. 2d 437 (Utah 1983), the defendant
was observed pushing a handcart and loading it into his vehicle.
The arresting officer knew the defendant, was acquainted with his
possessions,and knew that he had a criminal record.

The Supreme

Court found that the articulable facts, taken together, with rational
inferences therefrom, justified the stop of the defendant.
In State v. Cole, 674 P. 2d 119 (Utah 1983), the police
stopped the defendant's vehicle because it had no visible registration
or plates.

The Supreme Court held that there was an articulable

and reasonable suspicion that the vehicle was not registered, and
up held the stop, noting that "the police not only had a right to
make the stop, they had a duty to do so." 674 P. 2d at 123.(Emphasis
added. )

In State v. Swanigan, 699 P. 2d 718 (Utah 1985), the defendant and his companion were stopped, based upon a description by
another officer who had seen them walking along the street at a late
hour, in an area where recent burglaries had been reported.

The

Supreme Court held that the officer lacked reasonable suspicion to
believe they were engaged in criminal activity.
In State v. Carpena, 714 P. 2d 674 (Utah 1986), the defendant's
car was stopped, having out-of-state license plates, moving slowly
through a neighborhood where a rash of burglaries had recently occurred,
late at night.

The Supreme Court found that the officer had no objective

facts on which to base a reasonable suspicion that the men were involved
in criminal activity.
In State v. Constantino, 732 P. 2d 125 (Utah 1987), the
officer had learned, only days before the stop of the defendant's
vehicle, that the defendant's license had been revoked, and that
he was wanted on an arrest warrant.

The Supreme Court found that

those circumstances constituted sufficient reasonable
to make the investigatory stop valid.

suspicion

In so doing, the Court held

that " the statutory standard under which a police officer may stop
and question a suspect is not, as defendant would have it, probable
cause, but a reasonable suspicion which requires the officer to point
to specific and articulable facts

which warrant the intrusion."

732 P. 2d at 126.(Emphasis added.)
In State vs. Mendoza, 748 P. 2d 181 (Utah 1987), two Immigration officers stopped a car on the freeway, based upon the apparent
"Latin descent" of the occupants, the route of travel, the time of
day, the time of year, the California license plates, the erratic
driving pattern,and the nervous behavior of the occupants.
-9-

The Supreme

Court held that those facts did not support a reasonable suspicion
that the defendants were engaged in illegal activity, and found the
stop to be invalid.
In Brierley v. Schoenfeld, 781 F. 2d 838 (10th Cir. 1986),
the United States Court of Appeals for the 10th Circuit interpreted
the scope of Section 77-7-15.

In that case, a Utah highway patrolman

was found to have reasonable suspicion to stop a truck for a possible
overweight violation, based solely upon his observation that the
truck had "squatty" tires.

The Court specifically found that such

observation gave the officer the requisite "articulable and reasonable
suspicion" under the statute.
This Court, during the past two years, has addressed the
reasonable suspicion standard on several occasions.
In State v. Trujillo, 739 P. 2d 85 (Utah App. 1987), the
officer stopped the defendant, based upon them
area, at a late hour, their apparent

being in a high-crime

nervous conduct, and a "suspicious"

nylon knapsack carried by the defendant.

This Court found that the

officer did not have reasonable suspicion that the defendant was
engaged in criminal conduct, and that the stop was improper.
In State v. Sierra, 754 P. 2d 972 (Utah App. 1988), the
officer stopped the defendant, based upon his suspicious nature and
the way he acted when he saw him.

This Court held that there was

no reasonable suspicion that the defendant had committed or was about
to commit a crime .
In State v. Sery, 758 P. 2d 935 (Utah App. 1988), the
defendant was stopped at the Salt Lake International Airport, based
upon his nervousness, itinerary, name discrepancy,and unpublished
phone number.

This Court found that those facts did not constitute

reasonable suspicion that the defendant was engaged in illegal

activity.
In State v. Baumgaertel,
the defendant was stopped,

92

U.A.R. 50 (Utah App. 1988),

based upon the lateness of the hour, a

rash of burglaries in the area, and at the store where the defendant
was seen, a "hunch" that the truck was involved in criminal activity,
and the fact that the defendant's truck had not been present at the
site when the officer had passed by fifteen minutes before.

This

Court found that these factors were sufficient to establish reasonable suspicion to believe that the defendant was engaged in criminal
activity.
In applying the foregoing precedents to the facts of this
case, and in considering the reasonableness of the stop, it is important to remember that this Court must consider the totality of the circumstances facing the officers.

United States v. Cortez, supra. Fur-

thermore, because a "trained law enforcement officer may be able to
perceive and articulate meaning in given conduct which would be wholly
innocent to the untrained observer", he may assess these facts in
light of his experience.

State v. Trujillo, supra, 739 P. 2d at 88-89.

In this case, at the suppression hearing, the Court refused
to permit Sheriff Judd to testify about his experience with regard to
cars that have turned around and fled from roadblocks.
11-16, 38-39)

(Tr., pp.

The State believes that the Court erred in excluding

that evidence, and that the proffer of the Sheriff's testimony should
have been admitted into evidence.
Regardless of the admissibility of that evidence, however,
Sheriff Judd articulated the following reasons for pursuing and stopping the defendant's vehicle in this case:
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(1) the lateness of the

hour; (2) the lack of other traffic; (3) the flashing lights at the
roadblock; (4) the abrupt stop of the vehicle, when it saw the lights
at the roadblock; (5) the turn-around on the crest of the hill, as
soon as the driver noticed the roadblock; and (6) the turn-around in
the middle of the road, on a narrow mountain road, rather than at a
turn-out or intersection.
In light of his experience and training, Sheriff Judd immediately suspected that the vehicle was attempting to avoid the roadblock.

Indeed, it is difficult to conceive of an action which is more

likely to arouse suspicion that the driver of the vehicle was attempting to avoid contact with law enforcement officers, and had something
to hide, thus leading to the inference that the occupants of the vehicle were engaged in criminal activity.
Although this is an issue of first impression in this State,
the courts in at least two other states have held that the very act
of fleeing from a roadblock gives rise to reasonable suspicion to stop
the subject vehicle.

In City of Las Cruces v. Betancourt, 735 P. 2d

1161 (N.M. App. 1987), two separate stops at a roadblock were consolidated before the Court of Appeals of New Mexico.

One of those defen-

dants had failed to stop at the roadblock, while the other had not.
In the former case, the Court specifically held that failure to stop
at the roadblock constituted a sufficient reason for the defendant to
be stopped, 735 P. 2d at 1163, and the Court summarily affirmed the
denial of her motion to suppress.
Similarly, in Jones v. State, 723 P. 2d 984 (Okla. Cr.
1986), the Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma considered a situation
where the defendant had turned to avoid a roadblock.
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The Court found

that that act, alone, constituted a misdemeanor, and, under the Oklahoma warrantless arrest statute, which is virtually identical to Utah's,
the officer was justified in the subsequent stop and arrest of the
defendant.

723 P. 2d at 985.
"Because a determination of the reasonableness of the police

conduct is highly factual in nature, we review the facts in detail."
State v. Trujillo, supra, 739 P. 2d at 86.

The State of Utah respect-

fully submits that the totality of the circumstances facing the officers in this case, considered in the light of their experience and
training, gave rise to a reasonable suspicion that the occupants of
the vehicle in question were engaged in criminal activity; and, therefore, that the finding by the Circuit Court that there was no reason
to suspect criminal activity in this case was clearly erroneous.

The

Order Suppressing Evidence should be reversed by this Court.
POINT II: THE STOP WAS PROPER, BECAUSE IT WAS INCIDENT TO TRAFFIC
VIOLATIONS.
Utah Code Ann. §77-7-2 provides as follows:
A peace officer may make an arrest under authority of a
warrant or may, without warrant, arrest a person:
(1) for any public offense committed or attempted
in the presence of any peace officer; "presence"
includes all of the physical senses or any device
that enhances the acuity, sensitivity, or range of
any physical sense, or records the observations of
any of the physical senses;
(2) when he has reasonable cause to believe a felony
has been committed and has reasonable cause to believe
that the person arrested has committed it;
(3) when he has reasonable cause to believe the
person has committed a public offense, and there is
reasonable cause for believing the person may:

-13-

(a) flee or conceal himself to avoid arrest;
(b) destroy or conceal evidence of the commission
of the offense; or
(c) injure another person or damage property belonging to another person.
In this case, in addition to the officers having reasonable
suspicion to believe that the occupants of the vehicle in question were
engaged in criminal activity, the stop was also proper because it was
made incident to traffic offenses which were committed in the presence
of the officers.

State v. Sierra, supra.

First, while the Circuit Court may have been accurate in
finding that there is no Utah statute requiring motorists, upon observing a road block, to continue thereto to stop, the State of Utah respectfully submits that the Court was clearly in error in finding that
Utah Code Annotated Section 41-6-13 did not apply, since the defendant
never reached the road block; and that Utah Code Annotated Section 416-13.5 did not apply, since there was no evidence that any signal was
directed toward this defendant from the roadblock.
Contrary to the Court's findings, the testimony at the
suppression hearing was abundantly clear that, when the defendant's
vehicle came over the crest of the hill, the occupants would have
seen flashing red lights, yellow emergency flashers, and officers
standing in the roadway with flashlights.
118-119; Finding No. 5)

(Tr., pp. 22-24, 104-105,

Those lights would not have been easily mis-

taken for a traffic accident.

(Tr., pp. 37-38)

The defendant's ve-

hicle stopped abruptly and turned around in the middle of the road,
as soon as it saw the lights at the roadblock.

(Tr., pp. 11, 29)

Thus, the fact that the defendant never reached the roadblock is
-14-

irrelevant, in view of the evasive action taken by the vehicle as soon
as it became aware of the roadblock.
Utah Code Annotated Section 41-6-13 provides as follows,
in pertinent part:
(1) A person may not willfully fail or refuse to comply
with any lawful order or direction of any peace officer, ...
Utah Code Annotated Section 41-6-1.3.5 provides as follows,
in pertinent part:
(1) An operator who, having received a visual or audible
signal from a peace officer to bring his vehicle to a stop,
operates his vehicle in willful or wanton disregard of the
signal so as to interfere with or endanger the operation
of any vehicle or person, or who attempts to flee or elude
a peace officer by vehicle or other means is guilty of a
Class A Misdemeanor.
Utah Code Annotated Section 41-6-12 provides as follows:
A violation of any provision of this chapter is a Class B
misdemeanor, unless otherwise provided.
The State of Utah respectfully submits that the defendant's
failure to stop at the roadblock, after having received visual signals
to stop by the red flashing lights at the roadblock, constitutes a
violation of both Sections 41-6-13 and 41-6-13.5, and that the Court
erred in finding that those statutes do not apply in this case.

If,

in fact, the defendant's actions constituted a public offense committed
in the presence of the officers at the roadblock, then the stop was
proper as incident to those traffic violations.

State v. Sierra, supra.

Second, during the pursuit of the defendant's vehicle by
the Posse members on the way back to Panguitch, the testimony at the
suppression hearing was clear that the red lights on the Posse truck
were turned on, and that the defendant's vehicle made no effort to pull

-15-

over and stop in response thereto.

(Tr.,pp. 47-48)

Instead, when it

reached the outskirts of Panguitch, the vehicle turned off the main
road onto a side street, and then headed down a back street in town.
(Tr., pp. 50, 69, 91)

The State of Utah respectfully submits that

the continuing evasive action taken by the defendant's vehicle, after
having received a second visual signal to stop by the red lights on
the Posse truck, constituted a separate and independent violation of
Sections 41-6-13 and 41-6-13.5, and, therefore, the stop was proper
under Section 77-7-2.
Finally, the Circuit Court failed to recognize the application of Utah Code Annotated Section 41-6-67, which provides as follows,
in pertinent part:
(2) A vehicle may not be turned to proceed in the opposite
direction on any curve, or upon the approach to, or near
the crest of a grade, if the vehicle is not visible at a
distance of 500 feet by the operator of any other vehicle
approaching from either direction. (Emphasis added.)
At the suppression hearing, the testimony was undisputed
that the roadblock was located approximately one quarter-mile from the
crest of the hill where the defendant's vehicle turned around, and
that the road is a two-lane mountain road traveling through pinyon
and juniper

trees.

(Tr., pp. 112, 116-117)

Since it was at 1:00 a.m.,

it could certainly have been inferred by the Court that the defendant's
vehicle turned around on the approach to, or near the crest of, a hill
where it was not visible for 500 feet in either direction.

If so, then

that act constituted a separate Class B misdemeanor, under Section 416-12, committed in the presence of the officers, and would constitute
an additional, independent ground for the stop under Section 77-7-2.

-16-

In State v. Hamilton, 710 P. 2d 174 (Utah 1985), the Supreme
Court considered a case where the officer observed the defendant commit
a misdemeanor traffic offense, followed the defendant to make a stop,
and ultimately arrested the defendant.

The Court held that, since the

defendant failed to cooperate with the officer's investigation of the
traffic offense which he had witnessed, the officer was justified in
making an arrest to permit investigation and prosecution, and the arrest was valid.

710 P. 2d at 175.

In State v. Folkes, 565 P. 2d 1125 (Utah 1977), the Supreme
Court observed,
...When a police officer sees or hears conduct which gives
rise to suspicion of crime, he has not only the right but
duty to make observations and investigations to determine
whether the lav/ is being violated; and if so, to take such
measures as are necessary in the enforcement of the law.
(Emphasis added.) 565 P. 2d at 1127.
It is clear that a police officer may stop an automobile
for a traffic violation committed in the officer's presence.
Sierra, supra.

State v.

Therefore, even if this Court does not find, as have

the Courts in New Mexico and Oklahoma, in City of Las Cruces v. Betancourt and Jones v. State, cited above, that the act of turning and
fleeing from a roadblock itself does not give rise to reasonable suspicion

of criminal activity, or does not, itself, constitute a pub-

lic offense committed in the presence of the officers, the State of
Utah submits that traffic violations were committed in the presence
of the officers, and that the stop was proper as incident to those
violations.

The Order Suppressing Evidence should be reversed.-*-

1. The Order Suppressing Evidence denied defendant's Motion to Suppress
Based Upon Illegal Roadblock, and defendant did not appeal that denial.
Therefore, the constitutionality of the roadblock itself is not at issue
before the Court in this case.
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CONCLUSION
For all of the foregoing reasons, the findings of the Circuit Court were clearly erroneous, and the Order Suppressing Evidence,
in which the Court granted defendants Motion to Suppress Evidence
Based Upon Illegal Stop, should be reversed by this Court.
DATED this 31st day of October, 1988.

PATRICK B. NOLAN
Garfield County Attorney

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on this 31st day of October, 1988,
I mailed, postage prepaid, four (4) copies of the foregoing Brief of
the Appellant to MARCUS TAYLOR of LABRUM, TAYLOR & BLACKWELL, Attorneys for Defendant, 108 North Main Street, Richfield, Utah 84701.

Patrick B. Nolan
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STATE OF UTAH,
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FINDINGS OF FACT AND
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vs.

Case NO* 196

MARK TALBOT,
Defendant.

The above matter was considered by the Court on March 17,
1988 pursuant to Defendant's motion to suppress evidence. At the
hearing, witnesses testified and counsel argued the matter.
Subsequently, memoranda have been submitted and considered by the
Court. The evidence is sufficient to show the following facts:
1.

Robert V. Judd is the duly elected, qualified and

acting sheriff of Garfield County, Utah.
2.

A few days before June 19, 1987, the Sheriff met two

of his deputies in his office at Panguitch, Utah, where plans were
made for the intended operation of road blocks.
3.

At the meeting general plans were made as to the

time and location of the road blocks, i.e., that road blocks
were to be held in a few days at four specific locations: River
Lane, Panguitch Lake Road, Highway 89 North and Highway 89 South.
Contact was made with the commander of the Sheriff's Posse since
that organization would be providing supplemental personnel.

STATE VS. TALBOT
CASE 87-CR-196
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
PAGE -2-

4.

On June 19f 1987 at about 10:00 P.M. a road block

was established by the Garfield County Sheriff on U. S. Highway 89
at Milepost 130, a location about three miles south and east of
Panguitch, Utah.
5.
vehicles.

The road block was comprised of five people and four

The five people were the Sheriff, a Deputy and three

members of the Sheriff's Posse.
flashlights.

All were in uniform and carrying

The four vehicles were two police vehicles and two

private vehicles.

Each vehicle was equipped with standard, four-way

emergency flashers, which were in operation.
a law enforcement symbol on the doors.

Each vehicle displayed

Each police vehicle was

equipped with a red spotlight mounted on the driverfs door post
which was illuminated and flashing.
6.

The police vehicles were parked on the asphalt

portion of the highway but outside the traffic lanes so as to face
oncoming traffic.

The private vehicles were parked on the shoulder

of the highway.
7.

There were no flares, warning signs, nor any traffic

control devices used.
8.

All traffic was stopped at the road block where the

officers checked for drivers licenses, vehicle registration and any
safety equipment violations.

STATE VS. TALBOT
CASE 87-CR-196
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
PAGE -3-

9.

On June 20, 1987 at about 12:15 A.M. the Sheriff

directed the personnel at the road block to disband and re-establish
it on the Panguitch Lake Road at a location a few miles south of
Panguitch, Utah.
10.

The road block was re-established at that location,

minus one posse member and his private vehicle.
At approximately 1:00 A.M. the officers saw two headlights of
a southbound vehicle as it approached the road block.
11.

The officers observed that the vehicle stopped, made

a "three-point" U-turn and drove off in the opposite direction from
whence it came.
12.

No witness at the suppression hearing was able to

identify any public offense committed by Defendant up to that time.
In fact, at that point, no witness was able to identify the
defendant at all, although he later turned out to be an occupant of
the vehicle.
13.

No witness at the suppression hearing was able to

give any reason to suspect that Defendant either had committed an
offense, was in the act of committing an offense, or that he was
attempting to commit an offense.
14.

The following Utah Statutes cited by the State do

not apply for the reasons stated:

STATE VS. TALBOT
CASE 87-CR-196
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
PAGE -4-

(a) 41-6-26 sincef by its own terms, it applies to
traffic signals or signs which were not used in this
case;
(b) Section 41-6-13, since Defendant never reached
the road block.
(c) Section 41-6-13.5, since there is no evidence
that any signal was directed toward this Defendant from
the road block.
15.

There is no state statute requiring

motorists, upon observing a road block, to continue thereto
and stop.
The foregoing Findings of Fact are sufficient to
to support the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

The road block was proper since it was

planned in advance and since every car was stopped.
2.
suppressed.

The evidence seized from Defendant must be
It was seized in violation of (a) Article I,

Section 14, Utah Constsitution, (b) U. S. Constitution,
Amendments 4 and 14, and (c) Section 77-7-15 U.C.A.

Dated this ^ D - day of

AfQ-

19 %% .

DaVICT'L. Mower, Circuit Judge
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'day of

true, full and

correct copy of the above Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
was placed in the United States mail, first-class postage prepaid,
addressed as follows:

Mr, Patrick B. Nolan, Garfield County
Attorney, county Courthouse Building,
Panguitch, Utah (84759).
Mr. Marcus Taylor, Labrum & Taylor, Attorneys
at Law, 108 North Main, Richfield, Utah (84701)
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CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
GARFIELD COUNTY, PANGUITCH CITY DEPARTMENT

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

])

ORDER SUPPRESSING EVIDENCE

v.
)

MARK TALBOT,
Defendant,

Criminal No. 196

]

This matter came before the Court for hearing on March 17,
1988.

The State of Utah was represented by Patrick B. Nolan, Garfield

County Attorney.

The defendant appeared in person, and was represented

by Marcus Taylor, Richfield.

After hearing and considering the evi-

dence introduced at the hearing, and the memoranda filed by counsel;
and the Court having heretofore made and entered, in writing, its
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law,
IT IS, THEREFORE, HEREBY ORDERED, as follows:
1.

That defendant's Motion to Suppress Evidence Based Upon

Illegal Roadblock be, and it is hereby, denied.
2.

That defendant's Motion to Suppress Evidence Based Upon

Illegal Stop be, and it is hereby, granted.
DATED this

'3

day of May, 1988.
BY THE COURT:

APPROVED AS TO FORM:

/I/It//

A JfArjtJ*

Cjfcowrt

Judge

State vs. Talbot
ORDER SUPPRESSING EVIDENCE
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that a full, true and correct copy of the
foregoing ORDER SUPPRESSING EVIDENCE was placed in the United States
Mail, postage prepaid, on this the

\3—

day of May, 1988, addressed

as follows:

Mr. Marcus Taylor
Labrum and Taylor
108 North Main Street
Richfield, Utah 84701
Secretary
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DECISIONS UNDER FORMER LAW
Burden of proof.
asked that truck be picked up, saying there
had been a theft; majority held that there
Merchant relying on former 77-13-32 to0
justify detention or arrest of a suspectedd was a jury question as to whether dealer had
shoplifter has burden to show reasonable and<j reasonable cause to believe customer had
>r committed larceny. Greenwell v. Canyon Linprobable cause for believing items offered for
coin Mercury, Inc. (1978) 575 P 2d 688.
safe had been unlawfully taken by th$e
detained or arrested person; this section in^ Probable cause.
essence codifies the preexisting common law
Whether or not security officer of departdefense of probable cause to effect an arrestf
and expands it to incorporate specific private* ment store had reasonable and probable
persons in the shoplifting context. Terry v,* cause to arrest a shoplifting suspect was a
Zions Co-op. Mercantile Institution (1979) 6050,: question of fact for the jury. Draeger v.
Grand Central, Inc. (1974) 504 F 2d 142.
P 2d 314.
There was sufficient evidence upon which
Liability.
to base a jury verdict denying damages for
Store which had probable cause to detainn false arrest, where plaintiff, an eighteensuspected shoplifter's sister was not liablee year-old motorcycle rider, had placed a small
for false arrest even though sister was subset- article of merchandise in his helmet, justifyquently acquitted of shoplifting charge,i. ing a reasonable suspicion that he was shopDavis v. Zions Coop. Mercantile InstitutionH lifting. Fuller v. Zinik Sporting Goods Co.
(1973) 29 U 2d 336, 509 P 2d 362.
(1975) 538 P 2d 1036.
Jury's determination that store personnel
Limitation of evidence.
Where customer sued merchant for malK did not act reasonably and had no probable
cious prosecution, false arrest and false^ cause to arrest plaintiff for shoplifting was
imprisonment arising from alleged shoplift^ supported by evidence in suit involving
ing incident and introduced evidence the inck prewrapped package. Terry v. Zions Co-op.
dent left her severely depressed and suicidal,f Mercantile Institution (1979) 605 P 2d 314.
The standard applicable to detentions and
merchant which wished to introduce evidence'
of a prior shoplifting conviction and its sur- arrests by merchants is composed of both
rounding facts as affecting the issue of dam-* subjective and objective elements; the merages was properly restricted to showing fact1 chant must allege and prove not only that he
of the prior act and the identity of the party believed in good faith that his conduct was
involved in view of, inter alia, the similarity )awfu)f but also that his belief was reasonof the incidents and substantial likelihood of*. able; even if the crime was not in fact being
confusing the jury. Terry v. Zions Co-op, committed or attempted, if the merchant "in
good faith believes that such facts are
Mercantile Institution (1979) 605 P 2d 314.
present as to lead him to an honest concluMotive for arrest.
sion that a crime is being committed by the
Statute offered no civil immunity to a mer- person to be arrested" then he may not be
chant who initiated a customer's arrest forr held liable for false arrest; in determining
purpose of effecting a civil remedy to collectt the reasonableness of the conclusion, the test
money owed, even if the money was lawfullyr to be applied is one that is practical under
owed; thus statute did not shield auto dealerr the circumstances, i.e., whether a reasonable
from liability for false imprisonment where* and prudent man in his position would be
customer drove away in new truck after leav- justified in believing facts which would waring check for less than purchase price dealerP rant making the arrest. Terry v. Zions Co-op.
was demanding and dealer called police and\ Mercantile Institution (1979) 605 P 2d 314.

77-7-15. Authority of peace officer to stop and question suspect —
Grounds. A peace officer may stop any person in a public place when he
has a reasonable suspicion to believe he has committed or is in the act
of committing or is attempting to commit a public offense and may demand
his name, address and an explanation of his actions.
History: C. 1953, 77-7-15, enacted by L.
1980, ch. 15, § 2.
Collateral References.
Arrest <&=> 63.1, 6&

61

6ACJS Arrest §§38-42.
Law Reviews.
The Police Dog: Possibilities for Abuse in
Finding Probable Cause for Arrest, 1969
Utah L. Rev. 408.

-6-8

CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

-6-8. Judgment of removal — Service on defendant.
judgment of removal, the defendant's admission, would reconcile this section with
§ 77-6-7. Madesen v. Brown, 701 P.2d 1086
(Utah 1985).

onvicted."
nterpretation of term "convicted" to mean a
ermination by the court that the accusals constituting the basis for removal were
e, as opposed to the alternative basis for

CHAPTER 7
VRREST, BY WHOM, AND HOW MADE
Section
77-7-14. Person causing detention or arrest of
person suspected of shoplifting or
library theft — Civil and criminal
immunity.
77-7-19. Appearance required by citation —
Arrest for failure to appear — Collection of bail amounts by Office of
Recovery Services — Motor vehicle violations — Disposition of
fines and costs.

tion
7-2.
7-5.

By peace officers.
Issuance of warrant — Time and
place arrests may be made.
7-5.5. Fee for warrant service.
7-12. Detaining persons suspected of shoplifting or library theft — Persons
authorized.
7-13. Arrest without warrant by peace officer — Reasonable grounds, what
constitutes — Exemption from
civil or criminal liability.

-7-2. By peace officers.
\ peace officer may make an arrest under authority of a warrant or may,
thout warrant, arrest a person:
(1) for any public offense committed or attempted in the presence of
any peace officer; "presence" includes all of the physical senses or any
device that enhances the acuity, sensitivity, or range of any physical
sense, or records the observations of any of the physical senses;
(2) when he has reasonable cause to believe a felony has been committed and has reasonable cause to believe that the person arrested has
committed it;
(3) when he has reasonable cause to believe the person has committed
a public offense, and there is reasonable cause for believing the person
may:
(a) flee or conceal himself to avoid arrest;
(b) destroy or conceal evidence of the commission of the offense; or
(c) iiyure another person or damage property belonging to another
person.
Eistory: C. 1953, 77-7-2, enacted by L.
0, ch. 15, § 2; 1985, ch. 192, § 1; 1986, ch.
, S 1.
compiler's Notes. — The 1985 amendment
rote Subsection (1) which formerly read,
for a public offense committed or atpted in his presence."

10

The 1986 amendment, effective March 17,
1986, deleted "other than offenses under Title
41 where any non-jurisdictional element of the
offense is" preceding "committed or attempted"
in Subsection (1).

